

Towards root cause analysis of BGP routing dynamics

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
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Motivation

- Interdomain routing suffers from many problems
 - Instability
 - Slow convergence after changes
 - Misconfigurations
- Poor visibility into dynamics
 - What is the spectrum of causes of route changes?
 - What are the primary causes of instability?
 - How does BGP respond to a routing change?
- Incomplete model → incomplete solutions

How can we improve routing?

- BGP Health monitoring system
 - Collect routes from routers
 - Infer properties of network elements
 - Redistribute information
- Achieves greater visibility
- Our focus: how to do inference




Uses of a health monitor

- Troubleshooting/debugging
- BGP policies based on historical link/node stability
- Online help to path selection
- Help customers choose upstream providers

Inference problem


- Terminology:
 - **Event**: an activity that generates routing updates
 - **Suspect location set**: set of AS's and links where event could have occurred
 - **Suspect cause set**: set of types of events that could have occurred
- Problem: Given route updates observed at multiple vantage points, determine the **suspect set = suspect cause set, suspect location set** of routing events that trigger each update

Correlating Observations: Main idea




- **Quiescent:** Assume bursts of updates to a *single prefix* are correlated
- **Turbulent:** Assume updates to *many prefixes* are correlated
- Assuming correlated observations are independent worsens *precision*, but assuming independent observations are correlated worsens *accuracy*

Our approach




Turbulent Inference: Example




- Scenario #1:
 - ~1000 prefixes updated that used (A,C)
 - → (A,C) suspect

Turbulent Inference: Example



- Scenario #2:
 - ~4000 prefixes updated that used (A,B),
~2000 that used (B,E)
 - → (A,B) suspect

Turbulent Inference: Example




- Scenario #3:
 - ~2000 prefixes updated that used (A,B),
~2000 that used (B,E)
 - → (B,E) suspect

TurbulentInfer: Issues


- Effects of simultaneously occurring independent events are overshadowed
- Two large events simultaneously occurring
- Transition from Quiescent to Turbulent periods

Quiescent Inference: Example


- REROUTE
 - Silence, route change, silence
- Potential causes (yellow):
 - Link/router repair
 - MED/LocalPref decrease
 - Hold-down expired
- Potential causes (blue):
 - Link/router failure
 - MED/LocalPref increase
 - Hold-down triggered



QuiescentInfer: Inference across views




Event did *not* occur here




QuiescentInfer: Issues

- Simultaneous events:
 - Eg. Flap in one view, Reroute in another
 - Eg 2. Advertisement in one view, Withdrawal in another
- Community attribute changes
 - Community change can trigger reroute several hops away
- Multiple peering links



(a) Singly-peered



(b) Multiply-peered

Validation

- Well-known historical events
 - UUNET (10/3/02), AT&T (8/28/02) routing difficulties
 - Internet worms
- BGP beacons
- View at the origin


BGP Beacon results

<i>Suspect set size</i>	1	2	3	4	all
<i>Percent of bursts</i>	61%	92%	93%	97%	100%
<i>Inferences containing beacon AS</i>	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

View at the origin results

<i>Suspect set size</i>	1	2	3	4
<i>Avg. suspect set size</i>	7%	20%	36%	54%
<i>Incorrect inferences</i>	0%	0%	0%	0%

Results



- 70% of updates can be pinpointed to a single inter-AS link (pair of AS's)
 - More precise inference for more major events

Results

- Few AS's, links causing majority of updates
- Many previously unknown major events
 - **Peering instability**: July 21 2003: link between two tier 1's affected reachability to several popular prefixes over 10 hour period
 - **Misconfiguration**: Jan 26 2003: AS erroneously advertised 500 prefixes
 - **Reroute**: Jan 23 2003: link between two tier 1's causes many prefixes to switch to alternate paths

Future work

- Investigate continuously flapping prefixes
- Apply statistical inference techniques
- Placement of views
- Alarms/Triggers to detect unhealthy behavior
- Real time analysis
 - <http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~mccaesar/hmon.html>